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SOME REMARKS ON PLANTINGA'S ADVICE 
Peter van Inwagen 
Plantinga says, " ... the Christian philosophical community need not devote all 
of its efforts to attempting to refute opposing claims and/or to arguing for its 
own claims. .. . It ought to do this, indeed, but. .. if it does only this, it will 
neglect a pressing philosophical task: systematizing, deepening, clarifying 
Christian thought [about the problems of philosophy]." I express agreement 
with Plantinga about what the Christian community need not do; I go on to 
raise some questions about what "systematizing, deepening, clarifying 
Christian thought" about the problems of philosophy might come down to in 
practice. 
The essence of Plantinga's advice to Christian philosophers can be 
summed up in the following quotation: 
[W]e come to philosophy with pre-philosophical opinions; we can do 
no other. And the point is: the Christian has as much right to his pre-
philosophical opinions as others have to theirs. He needn't first try to 
'prove' them from propositions accepted by, say, the bulk of the non-
Christian philosophical community ... But this means that the 
Christian philosophical community need not devote all of its efforts 
to attempting to refute opposing claims and/ or to arguing for its 
own claims, in each case from premises accepted by the bulk of the 
philosophical community at large. It ought to do this, indeed, but it 
ought to do more. For if it does only this, it will neglect a pressing 
philosophical task: systematizing, deepening, clarifying Christian 
thought on these topics.! 
And what are "these topics"? I think it is fair to say that attention to the 
matter of the paragraphs that precede the quotation demonstrates that 
this phrase means, near enough, 'the problems of philosophy' or 'philo-
sophical questions'. (I hope that at least the latter formulation is abstract 
enough that no one will regard it as favoring some parochial view of what 
philosophy is. I suppose it could be said correctly, if not very informative-
ly, even of Nietzsche and Heidegger that what they did was to think about 
philosophical questions.) 
The opposing point of view could be summed up in the following prin-
ciple: 
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No philosopher should presuppose in his or her philosophical work 
any proposition that is not accepted by the bulk of the non-Christian 
philosophical community. 
When one considers this principle, an important refinement immediately 
suggests itself. Since Christians are a small minority among philosophers, 
there cannot be much difference between the set of propositions that is 
accepted by the bulk of the non-Christian philosophical community and 
the set of propositions that is accepted by the bulk of the philosophical 
community simpliciter. Let us therefore formulate the "opposing principle" 
this way: 
No philosopher should presuppose in his or her philosophical work 
any proposition that is not accepted by the bulk of the philosophical 
community. 
This formulation of the opposing principle has the advantage of not mak-
ing it appear as if its advocates were concerned to single Christians out, to 
place restrictions on the presuppositions of Christians-but not on the pre-
suppositions of Muslims or Marxists or theosophists or Freudians. The 
principle does not, it should be noted, forbid the philosopher to question or 
to attempt to refute propositions that are accepted by the bulk of the philo-
sophical community. Nor does it forbid the philosopher to attempt-like 
Descartes-to prove some of the propositions accepted by the bulk of the 
philosophical community, provided that he or she does not make use of 
any propositions not accepted by the bulk of the philosophical community. 
The principle does not even say that the philosopher may presuppose any 
proposition accepted by the bulk of the philosophical community. ft is 
therefore not a very strong principle. But it is certainly possible to violate it. 
Here are some simple examples. A Christian philosopher argues in one of 
the following ways-and without significant philosophical preamble: 
God is an immaterial being who has mental states; therefore, it is pos-
sible for there to be an immaterial being who has mental states; 
God sometimes performs miracles; therefore not all states of the 
physical world are consequences of its earlier states or else due sim-
ply to chance; 
It would be impossible for any real being to survey the whole of the 
set-theoretic universe; God knows all truths, but he could not know 
all the supposed truths of set-theory unless he could survey the 
whole set-theoretic universe; therefore, the belief of some platonist 
mathematicians and philosophers in the real existence of the set-theo-
retic universe is an illusion. 
But it is not only Christian philosophers who violate the opposing princi-
ple. It would, for example, be hard to argue convincingly that the axioms 
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of Spinoza's Ethic were even in his day accepted by the bulk of the philo-
sophical community-that the bulk of the late-seventeenth-century philo-
sophical community held that all Spinoza's errors were due to his having 
made various logical mistakes in course of constructing his demonstra-
tions. More to the point, it is very hard to believe that any philosopher of 
our own day really subscribes to the opposing principle. It is very hard to 
believe that there exists a set of propositions that the bulk of the present-
day philosophical community accepts and that even one member of the 
present-day philosophical community presupposes no propositions but 
those contained in this set. It is very hard to believe even that any present-
day philosopher thillks this is the way he or she proceeds. For one thing, it 
is very hard to believe that there is one intellectual community that com-
prises all those who do profess and call themselves philosophers. But let us 
waive this point. Let us consider a small, representative group of philoso-
phers who belong to the same intellectual community if any philosophers 
belong to the same intellectual community. Let us imagine that John Searle, 
Daniel Dennett, and David Chalmers are engaged in a philosophical 
debate about the nature of consciousness. (A good sense of what this 
debate would be like can be gathered from Searle's reviews of books by 
Dennett and Chalmers in the New York Review of Books, and the subsequent 
correspondence concerning these reviews. Searle's reviews and some of 
this correspondence have recently been collected by Searle in his book The 
Mystery of Consciousness. 2) If you try to imagine such a debate, you will see, 
I hope, that it is simply ludicrous to suppose that there is some set of 
propositions that is accepted by the bulk of the philosophical community 
and that Searle, Dennett, and Chalmers are each of them assuming the 
truth only of propositions that belong to this set. It is ludicrous to suppose 
even that this is what they think they are doing. Each of them does indeed 
assume certain things that are incompatible with Christianity-that the 
physical world is a closed causal system, for example-but that's not to the 
point. Each of them presupposes the truth of propositions that are contro-
versial indeed, controversial within the very intellectual community to 
which they belong, and this is a feature of all philosophical debates, past, 
present, and, I daresay, future. 
The part of Plantinga's advice I have so far discussed seems to come 
down to the statement that Christian philosophers need not regard them-
selves as bound by a certain principle that no philosopher in fact honors or 
tries to honor. This piece of advice is self-evident, trivial, and very valu-
able. It is valuable simply because Christian philosophers live in an intel-
lectual atmosphere pervaded by a curious double standard: Christian 
belief is judged and condemned under an epistemic standard that very lit-
tle of what anyone believes could satisfy. Let me give an example of this 
standard at work. A philosopher once told me that he could not accept 
Christianity or any other religion because there were many religions, each 
of them logically incompatible with the others, and it was impossible to 
determine which of them was correct. This is, when you think about it, a 
very odd thing for a philosopher to say, for, mutatis mutandis, it is an exact 
description of the situation in philosophy. And yet the oddness of what 
this philosopher was saying was something that had never occurred to 
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him. (The fact that it had never occurred to him-a very intelligent and 
well-trained philosopher-is itself a very odd fact, one well worth reflect-
ing on.) The double standard works like this: the beliefs of Christians-that 
the physical world was created by God; that Christ was raised from the 
dead-are condemned on epistemological grounds because their truth can-
not be demonstrated from principles that the bulk of the philosophical 
community accepts. But this standard is not applied to beliefs in most 
other areas-beliefs about the reality of universals, or about whether litera-
ture should be taught in universities on the basis of a canon of time-hon-
ored works, or about the effectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent. 
It is not, in fact, mentioned in debates about non-religious matters. 
Plantinga's advice to Christian philosophers, or the part of that advice 
that 1 have so far discussed, is therefore self-evidently true and very impor-
tant. But it will be noted that this advice is essentially a permission. 
Plantinga points out to Christian philosophers that they need not do a cer-
tain thing. And he points out that if they devote too much of their time to 
doing this thing that they need not do, they will have less time to do some-
thing important that they-or at least a significant proportion of them-
should be doing: "systematizing, deepening, clarifying Christian thought 
on [philosophical questions]." 
What exactly is this project that Plantinga recommends to Christian 
philosophers? 1 have tried to apply these words to myself. 1 have looked at 
my own work and I have asked myself whether what he recommends is 
something 1 do, and, if it is something 1 do, when 1 do it and how much of it 
1 do. One thing I find when I look at my own work, a thing that seems obvi-
ously relevant to his recommendation, is a fair amount of Christian apolo-
getic. Various philosophers have attacked Christianity on philosophical 
grounds, using the techniques that are generally approved of in my comer 
of the philosophical world. I, naturally enough, believe that all these attacks 
are in one way or another erroneous, and I have attempted to refute them. 
When I look at my work, I find, besides apologetic, attempts to solve philo-
sophical problems that are raised by various Christian doctrines-for exam-
ple, the problems about identity and predication that are raised by the doc-
trines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. And I find a few essays that are 
addressed primarily to my fellow Christians, essays in which 1 attempt to 
convince them of things that Christians generally don't believe, but which 
are, or so I maintain, compatible with Christianity and which should be 
"live hypotheses" for Christians. (For example, that we are living animals 
and have no immaterial part.) Do these essays, or some of them, represent 
cases of "Christian thought about philosophical questions"? 1 suppose they 
all do, but perhaps not in the same sense. I think we should be suspicious of 
phrases like "Christian thought," "Christian literature," and "Christian soci-
ety" -suspicious at least to the extent of making an effort to be absolutely 
clear about what we mean when we use them. (I believe that the name that 
was first proposed for this association3 was "The Society for Christian 
Philosophy," and that this name was rejected by Bill Alston on the excellent 
ground that it isn't clear what 'Christian philosophy' means.) 
One might honor these very proper suspicions by playing definition-
and-counterexample with the notion of Christian thought. Or one might 
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declare that 'Christian thought' is understood in several senses and pro-
ceed to enumerate and distinguish them-the various senses of the phrase 
being illustrated respectively by, say, The Imitation of Christ, Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, A Grammar of Assent, Murder in the Cathedral, and 
Warranted Christian Belief. You will be relieved to learn that, despite my sus-
picions about the phrase 'Christian thought' being very deep indeed, I am 
going to do neither of these things. I am not going to do either of them 
because I want to consider a fact that seems to me to present a more press-
ing problem: the body of my philosophical work falls under no definition 
of 'Christian thought' that anyone could conceivably find plausible. If this 
were a merely autobiographical fact, I would not bother to bring it to your 
attention. But I think that many (certainly not all) Christian philosophers 
are in the same situation as I in this respect. And, to revert my own case, 
not only does the body of my work fall outside the bounds of any reason-
able definition of 'Christian thought', but all the philosophical work I take 
the most personal satisfaction in falls in this category-all the work in the 
doing of which I have felt that my mind was operating at its highest capac-
ity. If you like: all the work I am most proud of. Here, pray God, I am not 
referring to pride in the theological sense, that perilous state of the soul ill 
which she challenges God's authority and attempts to become her own 
sole ruler. I am referring, I hope, to the pride of the artist or craftsman. The 
pride of the craftsman can, God knows, be the occasion of all manner of 
sin, but I do not think it is per se sinful. It is simply spiritually dangerous-
like erotic love or political action or concern for one's physical health. (The 
point of this list is: What isn't spiritually dangerous?) 
The proof that the body of my work in philosophy is in no sense 
"Christian thought" is simple enough: if you read this work in ignorance of 
its author's biography, you wouldn't be able to tell whether it was written 
by a Christian. This fact is not a consequence of some deliberate policy of 
mine; I have not chosen on methodological grounds to exclude my reli-
gious views from my work. (With one exception, which I'll mention in a 
moment.) It's just that I have generally had no opportunity to include or 
exclude them. Much of philosophy is simply so remote from the concerns 
of the spiritual life that, like number theory or condensed-matter physics, it 
does not interact with one's religious convictions. In this matter, religion 
can be usefully compared to politics. W. V. Quine, as most of us know, is 
politically very conservative. But one could never have inferred this from 
the writings on which his philosophical reputation rests. And this is not 
because he has adopted a deliberate policy of keeping his readers in the 
dark about his politics. It's simply because when one is writing about ana-
lyticity or ontic commitment or the problem of radical translation, one 
doesn't encounter many opportunities to express one's views on 
Reaganomics or capital punishment or affirmative action. And, of course, if 
one is writing on these topics one doesn't encounter many opportunities to 
discuss the Incarnation or the Atonement or the Body of Christ. 
I concede that the comparison is not exact. If one is a Christian, one's 
Christian beliefs interact with more philosophical questions than one's 
political beliefs, whatever they may be, for the beliefs that are de fide for 
Christians fall in very widely separated areas. Christianity is, as we might 
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say, about a very wide range of topics. This fact is connected with the" one 
exception" I mentioned a moment ago-with the one case in which I 
avoided appealing to my religious beliefs on methodological grounds. My 
book Metaphysics; since it was about metaphysics in general, by the nature 
of the case contained some discussion of those metaphysical questions that 
do impinge on theology; for example, the question, Why is there some-
thing rather than nothing? At the outset of the book, I explicitly confessed 
my Christian beliefs, and then explicitly stated that I wasn't going to 
appeal to them, or was going to try not to. But in that book there was a spe-
cial reason for doing this: namely that, in my view at least, a book that 
advertises itself as a general introduction to a subject (and one that is not 
written specifically for the members of some religion or denomination) 
ought to be as nearly neutral as possible about religious matters. 
It is obvious enough that many commonly held philosophical opinions 
are inconsistent with Christianity. A Christian cannot believe that the phys-
ical universe is all that there is or that the world had no beginning in time 
or that matter is inherently evil. (This last may not be a very popular posi-
tion nowadays, but times change.) Still, as I say, much of philosophy con-
cerns matters that have no connection with the life of the spirit. In philoso-
phy's house there are many mansions, and it is possible to wander about 
its corridors for quite a long while without encountering anything that 
either affirms or contradicts the Christian faith. 
Or so I say. But on this point, I think, there is some sort of disagreement 
between Plantinga and me. He finds much more of philosophy to be of rel-
evance to Christianity than I do. An adequate and fair discussion of this 
disagreement would have to take into account Plantinga's work on episte-
mology. I shall have to do the best I can without discussing this work, 
however, because to do so in any meaningful way would require a paper 
wholly devoted to that topic, and I am nearly finished with this one. I will 
confine my remarks to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. 
Plantinga and many other Christian philosophers see much in the cur-
rent philosophy of mind that is anti-Christian. And they are right about 
this if one sees rhetoric and incidental remarks as integral to the works in 
which they occur. It is undeniable that most current books and essays on 
the philosophy of mind contain fervent and frequent pledges of allegiance 
to philosophical naturalism. But to my mind, these pledges of allegiance 
are mere decorations. If you crossed them out, you would not affect the 
real philosophical content of the books and essays in which they occur, 
and, once you had crossed them out, there would be nothing in them that 
was inconsistent with or even unfriendly to Christianity. The exhortations 
to philosophical naturalism that one finds in the writings of John Searle or 
David Chalmers or Paul Churchland remind me of the opening words of 
an article in a Chinese geological journal that I happened to glance at in the 
early 1960s: "Applying the thoughts of Chairman Mao to the geology of 
the Yellow River Basin, we discover .... " (The remainder of the article 
was a perfectly straightforward piece of scientific writing.) Of course, the 
current philosophy of mind is resolutely anti-dualist, and anti-dualism per-
tains to the essence and not merely the accidents of its content. And it is 
true that some forms of dualism are consistent with Christianity; it is in fact 
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true that some form of dualism has been maintained by almost every 
Christian philosopher and theologian of any importance. Still, there is 
nothing anti-Christian about anti-dualism (anti-Hindu, yes; anti-Buddhist, 
yes). It is hard to find any support for dualism in the Bible (I would say it 
was impossible to find any biblical texts that unambiguously support dual-
ism), easy to find anti-dualist texts (or so I would argue), and it cannot be 
found in the Creeds. 
I have to admit that I am, as a philosopher, not very impressed with 
most current work in the philosophy of mind, but that is because most of it 
seems to me to be irremediably infected with metaphysical and logical 
nonsense, metaphysical and logical nonsense that 1 claim to have detected 
by the exercise of natural reason. Rhetorical decoration aside, I find little if 
anything in it that contradicts God's revelation. (Except, perhaps, in a cer-
tain trivial sense: One might argue that logical nonsense contradicts every-
thing.) If there is much in it that contradicts some of the human constructs 
that have been built on God's revelation, well, the same could be said of 
geology. We must never confuse revelation and the human constructs that 
have been built on revelation. 
Let me consider a second example, this one metaphysical. Plantinga 
contends that the Christian philosopher should believe that human actions 
are undetermined. But his argument for this thesis is odd. He argues that 
God is just and holds us accountable for our actions; and a just (and omni-
scient) being holds one accountable for one's actions only if one is account-
able for those actions. This seems obvious enough, but he goes on to argue, 
or, rather, to assert, that one is accountable for one's actions only if those 
actions are undetermined. From these premises he validly concludes that 
our actions are not determined. But it is obvious that God and his justice 
play no essential role in this argument. Essentially the same argument 
could be employed by anyone who believed that any being was both just 
and sometimes held people accountable for their actions. (For example, if 
Alice believes that she herself is just, and if she sometimes holds people 
accountable for their actions and believes that she is right in so doing, then 
essentially the same argument is available to her.) The crucial premise of 
the argument has nothing to do with God's justice. It is this: One is 
accountable for one's actions only if those actions are undetermined. And 
whether this premise is true is a purely technical question in philosophy, a 
question that a Christian and a non-Christian could debate in great depth 
and at great length without either discovering the religious views of the 
other. There are Christians who vehemently reject this premise (Jonathan 
Edwards, for example), and non-Christians who regard it as self-evident 
(R. M. Chisholm, for example-or Jean-Paul Sartre). I can imagine 
Edwards's reaction to his fellow Calvinist's suggestion that a Christian 
philosopher should regard human actions as undetermined. In reading 
Plantinga out from the pulpit, he would probably lay some stress on 
Romans 9:14-24, and exhort Plantinga to repent his Arminianism. (And 
what part of the Word of God could Plantinga appeal to in reply-other 
than the deutero-canonical text Ecclesiasticus 15:14?) 
Plantinga also argues that what is at stake in the debate about free will 
and determinism is really the concept of agent causation, which encapsu-
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lates, if I understand him, the properly Christian view of human action. 
But, as I see it, the question whether agent causation is a coherent concept, 
and the question whether (granting its coherency) it is of any use in making 
sense of free will, are purely technical questions in philosophy. Again, a 
Christian and a non-Christian could debate these questions in great depth 
and at great length without either discovering the religious views of the 
other. Plantinga argues that theists must believe in agent causation-they 
must believe that this is the mode of Cod's action-and that, therefore, 
Christians know that agent causation is a coherent concept and that they 
should therefore feel free to appeal to it in their theories of human action. 
But, for my part, I do not claim to understand how (in a metaphysical 
sense) God acts. All I know about God's actions are some propositions 
about the things he has done, propositions that are revealed in Scripture. 
And the Bible is not a metaphysical text. I grant that the words of Scripture 
are among the Christian metaphysician's data. In this respect, they are like 
the findings of science and the deliverances of the senses. Like the findings 
of science and the deliverances of the senses, they require interpretation 
and understanding before they can be put to any theoretical use. Whether 
the concept of agent causation can help us to arrive at any sort of meta-
physical understanding of God is to me an open question. But one thing is 
obvious: If it is not a coherent concept, it certainly can't. Since I am not con-
vinced that it is a coherent concept, the question remains open for me. And 
it remains a purely philosophical question, one I would debate with an 
unbeliever in much the same terms that I would with a Christian. And I 
would add that even if I were convinced that Cod, as agent, can bring 
about events that have no prior events as their causes, this would not seem 
to me to be much of an argument for the conclusion that it is possible for 
human beings to bring about events that have no prior events as their caus-
es. We may be, we are, made in Cod's image and likeness. Nevertheless, 
God and creatures are, metaphysically speaking, so vastly different, that 
any argument of the form 'God has F; therefore it is possible that human 
beings have F is bound to be rather weak--even in cases in which F is a 
property that is consistent with finitude and contingent existence. 
It seems to me, therefore, that the positive aspect of Plantinga's advice to 
Christian philosophers, if it contains nothing that is strictly false, has, as 
philosophers say, a false conversational implicature: That much of philoso-
phy overlaps Christianity in a significant way. My arguments, I concede, 
may be parochial. I have discussed only the philosophy of mind and meta-
physics, and have only briefly touched on these. (I have not, for example, 
talked about the possibility of arguing against philosophical naturalism.) 
Perhaps if I had examined ethics or epistemology, I should have come to a 
conclusion more favorable to Plantinga's positive advice. (By the way, one 
of the best examples of what is uncontroversially Christian philosophy I 
know-"best" as an example that shows what "Christian philosophy" 
could mean and "best" as regards philosophical quality--combines ethics 
and epistemology: Merold Westphal's "Taking St Paul Seriously: Sin as an 
Epistemological Category."') My suggestion that Plantinga's advice 
embodies a misleading implication about the relation between Christianity 
and philosophy should, therefore, be regarded not as a thesis I claim to 
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have established, but as a provocation, an attempt to stimulate discussion. 
If I myself have any advice to Christian philosophers, it is this. Don't 
suppose that philosophy is terribly important. (I'm going to except apolo-
getic from this general statement-not because I necessarily think that 
apologetic is terribly important, but because it is a special case that requires 
separate discussion.) Philosophy is what we philosophers do-in the sense 
that farming is what farmers do and cabinet-making is what cabinet-mak-
ers do. (Of course people in all three categories-philosophers, farmers, 
cabinet-makers-do lots of things besides philosophizing and farming and 
making cabinets, things like having families and resisting temptation and 
voting in elections.) I think the following thesis is one that we should all 
take seriously: the earthly works of Augustine and Aquinas that are 
remembered in heaven are not their writings; they are acts unknown to 
history, acts the earthly memory of which perished when the last people 
who knew Augustine and Aquinas in this life died.6 And-if we join them 
in heaven-so, a fortiori, it will be with us. 
The University of Notre Dame 
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